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Emerging International Criminal 
Justice 
Mark Findlay and Clare McLean* 
Introduction 
International criminal justice is sufficiently well established to merit an overview of its 
origins and institutional development. This paper stans out by identifying the institutional 
indicia of international criminal justice and their close connection to the development of 
international human rights protections. Underlying these structural and process signposts is 
some controversy regarding their motivations. Has fom1al international criminal justice 
emerged in response to novel and genuine concerns for the safety of humanity, or is it a 
manifestation of global governance priorities in post conflict scenarios, regional and 
international? 
Aligned with questions about where from, and why. is the distinction of an international 
jurisdiction for criminal justice. Without this the in1cgri1.y of international criminal justice 
:is a unique justict: paradigm is rightly suspect. \Ve argue that it is much more than spatial 
lo~ation or political entity which designa1cs and ddcrrnines intanationai criminal justice. 
The 'humanity' which is to be protected, and the nature of inhumanity that is prosecuted .. 
suggest new notions of constitutional lcgali1y and ~landing which can develop beyond tbe 
symbolisrn of the global comrnunity. 
Finally. the paper contrasts the pervasive but arguably less politically potent 
·aJrcrnative' 1 incarnations of international criminal justice. Tnith and reconciliation 
commissions, for inst~mce, could be said to have insured the relevance of internationai 
criminal justice to a host of viclim communities otherwise excluded from the fonnal 
institutions. The international criminal trial, on the uther"hand, will require transformation2 
if its conflict resolution potential is to be realised, and iflegitimate victim interests are to be 
incorporated in its legitimacy. We conclude by bridly speculating on 'where to 
international criminal justice?' 
Origins of Trial-Based International Crimiinal Justice - The 
Human Rights Connection 
Whichever specific point in time one posits as ib origin. thte connection between f01malised 
international criminal justice and individual human rights; is inextricable. The majority of 
Institute of Criminology. Law raculty. t! niversity of Sydney. 
The description 'alternative· for these paradigms of justice 1s mi:,llcading in that their coverage of victim 
communities and situations of post conflict resolution m:;k es t hem1 arguably more significant than formal 
justice institutions such as the international criminal trih~mal s. 
2 Findlay & Henham 2005 show how this might be ach1e\ ed 
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commentators assert that the creation of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
marked the birth of formalised international criminal justice.3 These proceedings clearly 
enunciated that individuals had actionable criminal liability under international law 
(Clapham 2003 :31 ), and, according to Teitel (1999:285), this international response to the 
atrocities perpetuated by the Nazis signified the beginning of the modem human rights 
movement. 
The Nuremberg Trials were closely followed, and to a large extent overlapped, the 
Tokyo War Crimes Trials, where Japanese Class A war criminals were brought before the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE).4 The legislative consequences of 
these tribunals were: 
the incorporation of the Genocide Convention (1948) into international law, 5 
the fonnal recognition of international human rights law through the UN adoption of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (l 948),6and 
the formulation of the Geneva Conventions ( 1949). 7 
Despite this initial energetic conflation of international human rights instruments and 
criminal justice institutions, the intervention of the Cold War saw both the concept and 
practice of international criminal justice removed from the forefront of global politics and 
relations. 8 Indeed, it became clear during this period that a more permanent grounding for 
international criminal justice would rely as much on favourable international political 
hegemonies, as on strong legislative mechanisms endorsing human rights and international 
criminal law. 9 
The 'revival of the international criminal justice project' (Megret 2002:7) came in the 
1990s, with the creation of international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY, 1993) and for Rwanda (lCTR, 1994). While Beigbedcr asserts that the 'essential 
historical, legal and judiciary basis' 10 of these derived from the N urernberg proceedings, 
Clapham (2003:43) argues they have gone beyond the immediate post-war response in 
clearly establishing 'that crimes against humanity exist as self-standing crimes'. That is, 
contrary to their fonnulation at IMT and IMTFE, 'these international crimes can [now] be 
prosecuted even in the absence of an armed conflict' (Clapham 2003:43). 
The TCTY trial and appeal chambers in patiicular have actively prosecuted an 
international crill?-inal jurisprudence. Most recently, with the elaboration of joint criminal 
enterprise theory 11 to enable the indictment of those collectively liable, the judges of the 
ICTY have identified unique foundations for interna1ional criminal law which will benefit 
its consolidation through the work of the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
3 See for example· Clapham 2003; Booth 2003; Rehman 2002; Teitel 1999. 
4 <www.mts.cuhk.edu.hk/NanJingMassacre/NMTT.html> accessed 6 October 2003. 
5 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ( 1948). 
6 Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on I 0 December 1948. For ftnther discussion see 
Rehman 2002:515-517. Although the Declaration is not hinding on states, Rehman argues that it 'stands out 
as the most authoritative commentary on international human rights and cnminal justice processes' 
(2002:516). 
7 For the full text of' the 1949 Conventions and the 1977 Protocols see <www.icrc.org/ihl.m:f/ 
WebCONVFULL?OpenView> accessed 6 October 2003. 
8 Perez (2000: 183) argues that the need to maintain Cold War alliances was responsible for the toleration of 
human rights and humanitanan law violations in this period. 
9 This is explored in the context of the war against tetrnr, in Findlay 2007a, and global governance, m Findlay 
2007b. 
!O Beigbeder 1999:49: reviewed by Megrel 2002:8. 
11 For a critical discussion of these developments and their lnmtations see Danner & Martinez 2005. 
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The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL, 2002) 12 is another product of this revived 
international criminal justice movement, while Indonesia's Ad Hoc Human Rights Tribunal 
on East Timor and the Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers, 13 although similarly 
constructed in response to mass human rights violations, differ in that they remain part of 
national criminal justice systems. 14 The SCSL is also notable in that it runs in parallel with 
a truth and reconciliation commission. This has led to some interestin~ cross-over between 
the jurisdictions of the restorative and retributive justice institutions. 1 
Beyond considerations of institutional justice manifestations, significant 'process' 
events in the recent pro~ression along this international criminal justice continuum, 16 are 
the Pinochet precedent 7 and the entry into force of the Rome Statute creating the 
International Criminal Court. 18 The Pinochet proceedings saw Spain. albeit because of the 
'vagaries of British extradition law and practice' (Perez 2000: 189), assert universal 
jurisdiction in 'a claim to vindicate the rights of humanity as a whole' (Perez 2000: 189). 19 
Furthermore, in terms of precedent, the House of Lords reached an 'arguably revolutionary 
legal conclusion stripping Pinochet of former Head of State immunity' (Perez 2000: i 89 
190). For Robertson ( 1999, quoted in Megret 2002:9) this suggests 'the age of impunity 
may be drawing to a close'. Indeed. Article 27 of the Rome Statute also asserts the 
'[i]rrelevance ofofficial capacity'. Furthern10re, in line with the developments of the ICTY 
and ICTR, the ICC has incorporated within its jurisdiction both violations perpetrated in the 
course of an internal arn1ed conflict (Article 8 of the Rome Statute), as well as crimes 
against humanity committed in the absence o[ or unrelated to. any conflict (Article 7 of the 
Rome Statute). This has enabled the first indictment issUL~d from the lCC to focus on 
allegations of crime emerging from armed conflict in the Republic of Congo. For many the 
creation of the ICC is the institutional culmination of the belief' that 'because individuals 
i:? Lstahii<-hc:d by the \j1c,.i:1/ C1•un l?l'<'i!'li<'l!i 1Ronfir,i!io11) ,q,·r ~1 1)()) hH· the fuli 'c'.t of 1!w; /\grcernenl 
f\)lilm ;he link" fror.i <.\i·W\v.SC-'>I ,-,r:.;• . r\CCC'.:•,t·d OC[!Jh:! }(!l!J. 
13 For ,icwil:-. ~,;e 1he Agrec1rn:nt bet\\ c:1.·11 the U'.'\ and C1rnh)d1a Cl!lt\ .:·rn111g. tb: l';-u:,ecm:cn unckr Cambodian 
Law or ( ·r:mc'.; (',,n-nmittecl d~1n11g the l\•p1, 1.j ,_,f Dc:1\~1cratL· !< 'lf!li!'l·:.ll~~a {() JU\L' 20()1 ). fu1 .m cutli:ll' SIX 
<W\\\t\.:J:,ii.org.idi!J''iltbO{,i l hm1J1al ~ <H:ces:~ej (, q1:tc1h~r ~:0()3 
14 1t sho1Jld be lo<Hcd that 'k1dc-;pn·ad d1s~~ausl»1ct1nn \\!th lnclonc~,;a·~ Ad Hr>c llunldn Rtghh Tribu.irni un [Cl~.t 
Tirnor h~is rep~~·tcdly kci to ca lb for ihe creaiinn of rlfl imleper1dt"ll mtemat10nal rr'.bunnl. For excimpie see 
< .. \VV'/w.gtobalp0lrcy orgimtljust1cc/tribun<>.b/1i1nor.'200JIC:-; I Xn:nc1,v htm> accessed 6 October 2001. 
15 For a discus-;ion of the case in quest1(1n ar;d iu cnnscqucnc<..'~ fo1 tie court s<.::e Cockayne 2005: Cockayne & 
Huckerby 2004. In Findlay & HenhatP 2()05 we art!l!e that hoth ju-;tice paraJigrns should reside in the 
transformed 111temal!onal criminal trial for the protection of chf rights and legitimate mkresls or victim 
communities. 
16 Booth (2003:191) views international crimiaal justice a:-, 'a ~·nn1inuum. a process that was catalysed in 
Nuremberg'. 
17 R \'Barrie and the Comnussioncr oj'Police /or the \fetropo/11 .incl Others, Ex Parle Pinnchct 37 ILM 1302 
(HL 1998) (hereinafter Er Parle Pi11oc her): R ,. B011 St J!e 1m .'>.i!/!< 0nd1my Magistrate and Others, Er Parle 
Pinochet (No 2) l All ER 577 (!IL I:;i()i/1999) (berc11ulkr L'I Partc P1110chet ff); R v Bartle and the 
Commiss·ione1· uf Poiice for the Metropo!ts 011d Othn.1 f-:, f'f.frte Pinochet :18 ILM 581 (HL 1999) 
(hereinafter F:x Porte Pmochet Ill). 
18 The Rome Statute of the International Cnminal Court (hcic' 11~1ffcr ~~ome Statute) entered into force on 1 July 
2001. For the fuil text s..oe <www.un.org/laV\ 1icc ;,t.Hutcromefra !1t;rf> accessed b October 2003. 
19 This assertion \.V% made 111 Spain\ ~ernnd rcquc~l f<'l the _.,tr .1d1t ion of Pinochet from the UK, since their 
first request. bemg grounded in p<Js'->i\c p..orsonaltt) iL1r:.;;d1l t1•1r. 1\·a~ demcd on the basis that :-,uch grounds 
would not have afforded British authoritrc' the ngil' tr, prv_,t:cL ll' 1m equivalent cJrcumstances under British 
law (Perez 2000: J 90). Other examples of cotmtnc~ <N,,crt111!2 lllni\ ersal jurisdiction include the 1987 
prosecution in France of Klaus Barbie for \.\artirne derortH1on:.. OJf civihans (Teitel 1999:292) and Israel's 
196 J pro5ecution of Adolf Eichmann for war er: me~ an.j c1 ;mi::s against humanity includmg genocide 
(Rehman 2002:517). 
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live under the international legal system, they must necessarily have rights and obligations 
flowing from it' (Booth 2003:186). 
Motivational Origins 
While international criminal justice clearly originated as a response to human rights 
atrocities, the motives underlying its emergence are the subject of much debate. The 
argument divides around the essential protection of humanity from new crimes and harms 
which only a global justice response can satisfy, or a wider mandate employing 
international criminal justice to advance the dominant political hegemony. It could be said 
that these motivations are not mutually exclusive, and in fact are crucially interdependent 
if the protection of humanity is to devolve from persistent military intervention. The critics 
of this alliance suspect that the more independent aspirations for justice will be captured by 
a dominant political ideology designating the legitimate global community, and the citizens 
worthy of protection (Findlay 2007a). 
i. A genuine humanitarian response? 
Proponents of this view hold that the phenomenon of international criminal justice and its 
practical manifestations are genuinely rooted in a universal desire to protect human rights 
and to redress those who have been violated.20 Several of the distinct justifications 
aniculated by the Permanent Members of the Security Council for the creation of the ICTY, 
when translated into general terms, can be seen to constitute the nonnative motivations 
behind international criminal justice viewed as a genuine humanitarian response. 21 Even so, 
these general pronouncements are pregnant with complex and competing considerations: 
(a) To provide.Justice.for the victims 
Justice in itself is a moral imperative at the heart of the law and of human rights. Yet there 
are also practical gains to be made in providing justice for victims, most notably to 
'discourage acts of retaliation' (Scharf2000:929). Jn the words of Cassese, the ICTY's first 
President the 'only civilized alternative to this desire for revenge is to render justice' .22 
Cassese points to the assassination of Simon Petlyura (fom1cr headman of the Ukrainian 
a1mics during the Russian civi I war) and Talaat Bey ('the great killer in the Armenian 
pogroms of 1915' (Arendt 1994:265, quoted in Cassese 1998: l)) by civilians to support this 
assertion, and quotes Arendt with approval when she says: 
[NJ either of these assassins was sati<>fied with killing 'his' criminal, hut ... used his trial to 
show the world through court procedure what crimes against his people had been committed 
and gone unpunished (Arendt 1994:265, quoted in Cassese 1998: l ). 
Co1son (2000:54) voices this concern on a larger scale, seeing the potential future outbreak 
of war as a consequence of rights violations not redressed. Quoting the ICTY's Deputy 
Prosecutor, Graham Blewitt, in support of this argument, McGeary observes, '[p]eople 
explain this war as a revenge for atrocities done in the past that were never punished. ' 23 In 
this view, then, international criminal justice derives from a wish to prevent future abuses 
perpetrated in the name of revenge. 
20 See, for example: Arbour 1997; Cassese 1998; Wippman 1999; Colson 2000; Scharf 2000; Rehman 2002; 
Clapham 2003. 
21 These justifications are set out and discussed in Scharf 2000:928~9.33. 
22 International Tnbunal for the Former Yugoslavia, First Annual Report, at para 15, UN Doc IT168 ( 1994 ). 
Cited in Scharf2000:929. 
23 Cited by Colson 2000:54, and referenced to McGeary 1996:22--27. 
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The tension between retribution and revenge is just one dilemma faced in reconciling 
legitimate victim interests. Once the victims of crimes against humanity, or victims of 
genocide are established and located (no easy task on some occasions), the challenge for 
international criminal justice is to provide the maximum access for those interests in an 
atmosphere of rights protection which enables victim integration to the extent that the 
legitimacy of the justice response is better ensured. 
(b) To establish accountability for individual perpetrators 
Again, aside from the moral need to address the particular individuals to whom 
responsibility for human rights abuses can be traced (Colson 2000:54), there is a practical 
component to this objective. It stems from the fact that 'the perception of collective guilt 
only fosters new cycles ofretribution' (Mendez 1997, cited in Perez 2000: 175, n2). Support 
for this view is provided by Scharf, who argues that the assignment of collective guilt which 
characterised the post-WWII years 'in part laid the foundation for the commission of 
atrocities during the Balkan conflict' (Scharf 2000:930). The logic is that reconciliation is 
impossible in an atmosphere of blame, one faction by another. 
On the other-hand, an over-reliance on individual liability in instances where crimes and 
harms were the consequence of contribution may promote show trials, rather than any real 
attempt to punish proportionally collective responsibility. 
( c) To facilitate restoration of peace 
This is inextricably linked to the aforementioned justifications, that is, avoidance of acts of 
revenge and the facilitation of reconciliation are integral to the restoration of peace. In 
concluding that 'leaving indictees at large [would] preclude the establishment of the rule of 
la VI< and democracy in the former Yugoslavia' f Cassese 1998:9), Cassese turns to Hegel: 
'./iatjustilia ne fH:reat mundus' (justice sh~1uld be done, ~o that the world will not perish) 
(Hegel 182 l, quoted in Cassese 1998:9). 
Again, this is a nonnative quest. Peace here is the natural consequence 0fvicwr's justice. 
thfortunatcly, in the context of comts and trials it is not the pe:::;cc that trnth and 
rcconcilialion can bring. Rather it is D Jcsirc for peace which i:-; enforced through conquest 
and confirmed through liability. From the view of many victim communities it may not be 
a long-lasting peace. 
\d) To develop an accurate historical record 
Cassese (1998:5-6) identifies this as one of the 'notable merits' of 'bringing culprits to 
justice', since it means that 'future generations can remember and be made fully cognisant 
of what happened'. Why is this important? Again the objective is practical -- a definitive 
account 'can pierce the distortions generated by official propaganda, endure the test of time, 
and resist the forces of revisionism' (Scharf 2000:932), 'no tradition of martyrdom ... can 
arise among infonned people'. 2'~ The presumed logical conclusion is that, consequently, the 
perpetrators of human rights abuses will __ not one day be emulated, nor will ethnic violence 
emerge in response to a distorted truth. 2.) 
24 Report lo !he Pn~sident from Justice Robert H Jackson, Chief Counsel for the United States m the 
Prosecution of Axis War Criminals, 7 June 1945. Quoted in Scharf 2000:931. 
25 In deciding to establish the ICTY, the US Representative of the UN Security Com1C1l remarked that the 
Tribunal would develop an historic record for a conflict in which distortion of the trnth has been an essential 
mgred1ent of the ethnic violence. Reported in Scharf 2000:931. 
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However, through the determination of trial justice presently constructed, truth is not 
always, or even, the path to proving the case. What is sufficient as evidence, and what stands 
as fact upon which a successful prosecution can rest, is the story that survives the 
adversarial contest. This is not negotiated truth. Without truth determined, reconciliation 
may not accompany retribution as the essential outcomes of international criminal justice. 
( e) To deter perpetration of atrocities elsewhere 
This aim is also viewed as one of the main reasons 'the international human rights 
community enthusiastically embraced' the Pinochet proceedings (Wippman 1999:473). 
The reasoning in this respect is that the UK decision to di vest Pinochet of his Head of State 
immunity, along with the Chilean Supreme Court's reiteration of this decision and their 
initiation of prosecution proceedings against him, will serve to deter 'other dictators in the 
making' (Wippman l 999:474J from perpetrating similar human rights abuses lest they too 
be subject to such treatment.2 As Perez (2000: 189) has stated, 'the calculations ofofficials 
responsible for human rights violations can never be the same'. In a similar vein, it is often 
proposed that the frequent recurrence of human rights abuses in the twentieth century is 
partially attributable to the consistent failure to punish those responsible. For example, 
Cassese (1998:2) argues that the unforeseen consequence of allowing the perpetrators of the 
Armenian genocide to proceed with impunity was that 'it gave a nod and a wink to Adolf 
Hitler and others to pursue the Holocaust some twenty years later'. Similarly, Goldstone 
(the first Prosecutor of the ICTY) has concluded that the failure to prosecute Pol Pot 
(Cambodia), Idi Amin (Uganda), and (at that time) Saddam Hussein (Iraq) encouraged the 
Serb policy of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia and the commission of genocide 
by the Hutus in Rwanda with the expectation that they too would not be held accountablc.27 
Thus, Arbour ( 1997:535) asserts, with respect to the ICTY, 
for the first time since Nuremberg and Tokyo, a serious attempt is being made at punishing, 
and therefore possibly preventing, the perpetration of the most horrendously violent, large 
scale criminal attacks on human life. 
That for many 'deterrence is the most important justification Cl!ld the most important goal' 
(Wippman 1999:4 74) of international criminal justice is commonly acknowledged. 
However, this is another justification which cannot, without much deeper empirical 
foundation, stray far from normative ascription. 
ii. A politically motivated re.\pon.H! 
The contrary position, however, is that the commonly purported justifications above 
disguise less altruistic motivations. 'Surely. international criminal justice also tells another 
story, one that is at least more ambiguous, more fraught with power' (Megret 2002:9). At 
the heart of this view is the disbelief that these reasons provide an adequate answer to the 
question: 'why would states ever bother to create institutions that might end up turning 
against them?· (Megret 2002: I 0) Instead, Megret (2002· 15) posit.;; the view that it is interest 
shaped by political culture which dictates whether or not states support the international 
criminal tribunals ~ICTY and ICTR). 
Jn the context of the Bosnian crisis, several commentators have identified the 1992 
media reports of concentration-type camps as the key turning point in the international 
26 This view persi~ts despite the fact that proceedings against Pinochet were subsequently suspended and 
eventually tem1inated on the grounds that he was too ill to undergo such a tnal. Coincidentally, these 
proceedings were tenrnnated on I July 2002, the same clay the Rome Statute entered mto force. 
27 Reported in Scharf 2000:926 927. 
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response.28 In reactivating the 'religious imagery of the victim' (Hazan 2000:76, quoted in 
Megret 2002: 17), these reports 'touch[ ed] at the very heart of European memory' (Megret 
2002: 17) and resulted in a public demand for action (Megret 2002: 17). This outcry was 
amplified by what Robertson calls the 'CNN factor' (Robertson 1999, quoted in Megret 
2002: 17), whereby CNN became a 'recruiting officer for the human rights movement' 
(Robertson l 999:xix, quoted in Megret 2002: 17). Yet, it is the way in which this pe1meated 
'political issues and outcomes' which is, in Megret's opinion, the key to understanding how 
international criminal justice came to b~ manifest in the shape of international criminal 
tribunals (Megret 2002:18). Ultimately, 'the outcry ... [made] it necessary to give the 
impression that something was being done about the crisis' (Megret 2002: 18). That is, 
the transformation of the Yugoslav crisis from a principally political problem to an ethical 
one in the eyes of public opinion set off a bizarre and frantic race for historical legitimacy 
between France and the United States. Each of these states seemed to calculate that, if an 
international criminal tribunal were to be created at all, it would be in their interest to be 
associated with the aura ofreviving the idea, while not pushing it so far ahead that it would 
get out of hand (Megret 2002: 18). 
While Megret (2002: 19) concedes that there were "elements of domestic liberalism' at play, 
his commentary is imbued with the notion that the institutional embodiment of international 
criminal justice was an unintended consequence of the rhetoric of morality activated to 
appease public opinion. Hazan also views the tribunals as an 'anxiolytique' for public 
opinion rather than as long-term commitments to international criminal justice (Hazan 
2000, quoted in Megret 2002: I 9), wlii!e, according to Scharf, 'America's chief Balkans 
negotiator at the time, Richard Holhrooke, has acknowledged that the tribunal was widely 
perceived within the government as little more than a public relations device and as a 
. 11 r I 1· J' Jl) potentia y usem po icy too .~ 
1n support of their '.;ceptical st<mcc, Mcgrct and Schmf poin1 to the fact. that the ICTY was 
'remarkably und..:-r--l\mdcd' (Scharf 2000:9.14) during i1'., fir:.;t yeap:; in operalion, 'a toy in 
the hands olthe great pov.,cr~.; ... reined in whenever it sl1(n,ved signs of threatening the status 
quo' (Jv1egret 2002:21). Yet, despite these "dismal beginnings' (Megret 2002:21), the 
outlook i:, positi vc. The judges of the ICTY haw 'transforrn! ecr] thcm;;c!Yes into crus2.dtng 
Jjplomats' (1\1 egret 2002:2:5), as such ·a thorough mix of liberal legalism and realist interest 
is what characterize[dj the emergence ~uid consolidation uf international criminal justice 
towards the end of the twentieth century· (lvlegret 2.002:29 30). H remains to be seen "how 
far inkrnationai criminal justice's "'own momentum'' will take it' (Megret 2002:32). 
How 'International' is International Criminal Justice - The 
Relationship between International Criminal Justice and National 
Criminal Justice 
Having reflected upon the institutional origins of formal criminal justice and the arguments 
concerning motivation, the question naturally follows, hmN is the distinction 'international' 
to be established and maintained? Are we mereiy masquerading some hybrid procedural 
tradition, or has a new jurisdiction and standing in }Ustice emerged?30 
28 for example: Ball 1999. Hass 2000; Be1gbedcr 1999, Iiaza~1::: 100. Robertson 1999, Scharf 1997. Reviewed 
by Megret 2002:17. Notably, howner, thc~e r.:port'- \\trc :ncr· to be unfounded --- see for example: 
<www.terravista.pt/guinchoi2J04/1998 l 01deichmann __ 9 70 l ht!r, 1-> and <www.balkan-archive.org.yu./ 
politics/conc __ camps/html/Kenney.html> acces~ed 7 Octobc r :m:u 
29 Washington Post, 3 Oct 1999; quoted at <www.fair.org: rcpu 1rb/po'il·-war-crimes.html> accessed 7 Oct 2003. 
30 Thi" is critiqued in Cockayne 2005 
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a) Why is international criminal justice required in lieu of national criminal 
justice?31 
From the outset it should be noted that the principle of complementarity, central to the 
Rome Statute (Article 1 ), asserts ICC jurisdiction only where national criminal justice 
systems are either unable or unwilling to try international crimes in accordance with the 
requirements of due process. Even so, for the USA in particular, the suspicion that the ICC 
jurisdiction would compromise domestic autonomy has proved a baiTier to some states 
signing up to the ICC mission. 
Thus the most pertinent arguments for international, rather than national, criminal justice 
are those pertaining to the usual instability of national criminal justice systems in countries 
ravaged by mass human rights atrocities. Aside from the reality that the societies in question 
will often be 'too fragile to survive the destabilising effects of politically charged 
[domestic] trials' (Cassese 1998:4), the central concern is that these national criminal 
justice systems may be incapable of conducting impartial proceedings.32 For example, with 
regard to the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, Arbour (1997:534) has stated, 'for different 
reasons, the national criminal justice system was too incapacitated to satisfy the forms of 
justice in the context of the enonnity of the injury inflicted on the social fabric of these 
countries by the crimes committed'. 
Indeed, one of the reasons the R wandese Government itself supported an international 
Tribunal was 'its desire to avoid any suspicion of its wanting to organize speedy, vengeful 
justice' (Arbour 1997:535). Thus, as Lord Hope stated in the Pinochet proceedings, 'justice 
must not only be done; it must be seen to be done' (quoted in Delmas-Marty 2002:290). lt 
is on these grounds that Delmas-Ma11y (2002:293) called for an international judicial 
response to the September 11 2001 attacks, her concern being that the US national criminal 
justice system would conduct 'procedures that resemble vengeance more than justice' and 
ones which would violate the legality principle of criminal law - that is that 'crimes must 
be defined precisely and that laws imposing harsher penalties may not be imposed 
retroactively' (2002:289). 33 
Yet while international proceedings would likely be tainted with less bias than national 
trials, a belief in complete impartiality is overly optimistic. For example, with respect, 
Cassese's ( 1998:7) assertion that 'international judges have no national, ethnic or political 
axe to grind' demonstrates a surprising naivete of the complexity of global relations. It also 
contradicts his previous statement that 'international judges may be in a better position to 
be impartial and unbiased than judges who have been caught up in the milieu which is the 
subject of the trials' (Cassese 1993:7). This is a more realistic view. 
A convincing argument for international criminal justice in place of national criminal 
justice is the fact that trans-national investigation is easier for an international court to 
accomplish (Cassese 1998:8), as is the extradition of those 'who have found refuge in 
foreign countries' (Arbour 1997:535). Furthermore, as Kelson noted in 1944, 
31 Cassese ( 1998:6) poses this question. 
32 A failure to do so would run counter to the principle of procedure, set out in both the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms ( ECHR), which asserts the right of an individual to be judged by an impmiial and 
independent tribunal. For full texts sec <www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a ___ ccpr.htm> and <www.echr.coe.int/ 
Eng/BasicTexts.htm> accessed 7 October 2003. 
33 This principle, from which international human rights instruments do not pem1it a state to derogate (even in 
'exceptional circumstances') is set out in both ICCPR and the ECHR. 
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'[i]nternationalisation of the legal procedure against war criminals would have the great 
advantage of making the punishment, to a certain extent, uniform', where national courts 
will likely 'result in conflicting decisions and varying penalties' (Kelsen 1944: 112, quoted 
in Cassese 1998:8). Finally, is the logic that just as domestic crimes are tried in national 
courts, crimes against international law should be tried in international courts - in the words 
of Roling, 'an international judge should try the international offences. He [or she] is the 
best qualified' (Roling 1961:354, quoted in Cassese 1998:7). This argument, however, has 
not been wholeheartedly embraced - indeed the inclusion of the complementarity 
principle within the Rome Statute will likely mean national prosecutions are far more 
frequent than international proceedings. It might also betray the reality that we are a way 
off from a truly international judicial profession (see Wessell 2006). 
b) How have international criminal justice and national criminal justice 
impacted on each other? 
The concepts of 'hybridisation' and 'hannonisation' set out by Delmas-Marty (2003:13) 
have been influential (if perhaps overstated) in understanding this relationship. Asserting 
that the intended operations of the ICC are the modem epitome of international criminal 
justice, the exercise of these concepts in norn1ative form has been realised in the ICC 
empowering legislation. So saying, it is too simplistic to offer an ana~sis of international 
criminal procedure as the comfortable marriage of dominant traditions. 4 The jurisprudence 
of the lCTY in particular has shown that any convergence of national traditio~1s is a random 
and peculiar exercise, heavily dependent on the context of the deliberations.-''.' 
The Rome Statute is the product of extensive deliberation and compromise amongst 
numerous states. Consequently, it not only embodi1:s an amalgamation of a wide range of 
national criminal justice pnnciplcs, but it incurporati:s elements of both the adversari<J! and 
inquisitorial processes: it is a hybrid being. Tochilovsky (2002:268) provides a detailed 
discussion of the:-}e procedural issues, and questions hnv" ·~uch 'conflicting visions' will be 
resoh·ed in practice. He points out for example, the foci tl1at vvhik the Rome Statute and 
the Rules of Proc1,~dure and Evidcncc36 'impose a duty on the Prosecution to eqnally 
investigate both in.::rirninating «nd exonerating circumstam~1::s' ., tli.:::y :~imultancously assume 
that each party ·will "prepare and present its own case' (Tochilovsky 2002:268). 
Fm1hcrmorc, vvhile the common-law tradition of piea-bargaining is not precluded by the 
Rules, judges are obligated 'to seek the trnth regardlc~s of any agreements reached by the 
parties' (Tochilovsky 2002:268). It is the fact that judicial discretion will determine how 
these discordant approaches play out in practice. that is the source of Tochilovsky's 
apparent dissatisfaction with this state of affairs,37 rather than an opposition to Delrnas-
Marty's vision of a 'pluralist, universal conception of international criminal Jaw' (Delmas-
Marty 2003: l 3). Indeed, this vision is one he seems to share----- 'jurists from various parts 
of the world, representing different systems and cultures, will play a crucial role in further 
development of a unique international crimmal law system in the ICC' (Tochilovsky 
2002:275). If the experience of the ICTY is anything to go by, this dream of a judicial 
34 The synthesis of procedural traditions m the face of prag;rnt c c-omprom1se, and the alienation of other 
important traditions beyond civil and common la\\ b rres,'n, eti: n F:mdlay 2001. 
35 Even down to the influence of research sources ;s speculatec up' in b1y Bohlander & Findlay (2003 ), 
36 Hereinafter 'the Rules', For full text see <ww\\' Lumn, 2du hunnanrts/instree/iccmlesofprocedure,html> 
accessed 7 October 2003, 
37 Henham (2004) takes issue with this and m turn propose·c, am cmhancement of judicial discretion it the 
international com1 context 
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'internationale' can be derailed by the persuasive preferences of an aggressive prosecutor 
or a resilient judicial chamber. 
The interaction of international and national criminal justice systems does not end here. 
A harmonisation process is evolving for the ICC, whereby the composite set of principles 
embodied in the Rome Statute have been legislatively incorporated into the national 
criminal law of many states. A prime example is the entry into force, on 30 June 2002, of 
the German Code of Crimes Against International Law (CCIL).38 In providing for 'the 
universal prosecution of crimes against international law through the German criminal 
justice system', the CCIL 'transfers the substantive criminal law prescriptions of the ICC 
Statute into German law' (Werle & Jessberger 2002: 192). The significance of this lies in 
the fact that the CCIL establishes 'the punishability of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity for the first time in legislation of the Federal Republic of Gemrnny' (Werle & 
Jessberger 2002: 192, emphasis added). That similar legislation has been enacted in no 
fewer than eleven countries throughout the world is testament to the stre~th of the 
influence of international criminal justice on national criminal justice systems. 3 
With one exception, the Rome Statute does not obligate states to transpose the 
substantive criminal law of the Statute into its domestic legislation.40 The driving force 
behind such reform is complementarity. The expected consequence of this principle is that 
the 'enforcement of international criminal law through national courts will remain the 
backbone of the international criminal justice system' (Werle & Jessberger 2002: 194). 
States, then, have the opportunity to retain their autonomy with regard to prosecution of 
violations of international criminal law committed within their territory or by one of their 
nationals. As Werle and Jessberger argue, this is 'a strong incentive to consider domestic 
Jaw in light of the Statute' (2002: 195, emphasis in original). Jn this subtle way, as Clapham 
(2003:65) suggests, '[t]he complementarity principle at the heart of the Statute has 
generated a complementary transnational legal order for the prosecution of international 
crimes'. 
Yet, although it has had arguably the greatest impact in this respect, it is not just in 
response to the Rome Statute that principles of international criminal justice have been 
transposed into national systems. As Arbour ( 1997:536) points out, the Statute that created 
the ICTY41 bound Member States of the Security Council to cooperate with the Tribunal 
(Article 29). Consequently, many countries 'enacted specific legislation permitting them to 
discharge these obligations' (Arbour 1997:536). The influence was limited, however, since 
several states neither undertook such reform nor 'formally notified the Tribunal of their 
ability to comply under their existing national law' (Arbour l 997:537). Rehman (2002:510) 
also argues that there exists 'a strong and influential relationship between national criminal 
justice systems and international human rights law'. Given the incontrovertible evidence of 
the relationship of international criminal justice with international human rights, it is 
appropriate to draw on this argument here. The principles of customary international law 
and the immutable rules ofjus cogens form the basis for Rehman's claim. Whilst states are 
38 An English translation oftht:' CCIL is annexed to Werle & Jessberger 2002. 
39 For the full text of the Draft Legislation, Enacted Legislation and Debates relating to the nnplementation of 
the Rome Statute mto national law see: <www.iccnow.org/resourcestools/ratimptoolkit/nationalregional 
tools/legislationdebates.html> accessed 7 October 2003. 
40 The exception is Article 70(4)(a) which provides that 'Each State Party shail extend its criminal laws 
penalizmg offences against the integnty of its own investigative or judicial process to offences against the 
admimstration of justice referred to in this article, committed on its territory, or by one of its nationals'. 
41 Statute of the International Tribunal (adopted 25 May 1993). For full text see: <www.un.org/tcty/basic/statut/ 
statutc.htm> accessed 7 October 2003. 
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required to comply with the latter, there is no obligation to incorporate specifically any 
relevant provisions into domestic legislation. However, as Rehman (2002:518) points out, 
'[i]n practice almost all states have adopted constitutional practices to conform to the norms 
ofjus co gens'. In offering additional support for his overall argument, Rehman proposes 
that trea~ bodies, for example the Human Rights Committee42 and the Committee against 
Torture, 3 have influenced the practices of many states, including 'pariah states such as 
Iraq, Libya and Sudan', having led them to reconsider their own domestic criminal justice 
system in terms of its human rights policies (Rehman 2002:522). 
How is International Criminal Justice Manifest? 
It is a commonly shared view that justice is revealed in the application as much as it may 
be in the normative aspirations for its outcomes. 
Formal institutions 
As Scharf (2000:927) argues, 'ri]t is one thing to create an international institution devoted 
to enforcing international justice; it is quite another to make international justice work'. For 
some, that the ICC has no constabulary, no subpoena power and cannot sanction states 
directly in the event of non-compliance, may make this latter objective impossible to 
achieve (eg Scharf 2000; Roznovschi 2003). However, the most frequently made arguments 
for the impotence of international criminal justice are the low rates of indictments, trials and 
convictions effected by the lCTY and the ICTR. fn its first six years of operation the fCTY 
issued ninety-one public indictments, but tried 3nd sentenced only six individuals 
(Wippman 1999:476). Wipptrnm ( 1999:476) points out, 'these numbers are miniscule 
relative to the numbers of persons <H:tnally respnmihlc for criminal violations of 
international humanitarian lavv '. fmthern1ore, '! i lt \Nill rah:ly be possible to prosernte more 
than a representative :-:-amplmg of ~ho~;e n.·spom;[t)k frir z;_..;nocidc, crimes against htirnani1y, 
and war crimes' ( l 999:4x0). That this is the cas',~ doc:-. not t;ode \veil for the proposed 
dctetTent effect of the inicrna!ional trihunals anJ the lCC,4'' casting serious douht on 
optimistic prnc1mmnior,s :-:.i!ch :13 '[tlhc real :;,tct) of the n.cw Com1 rn~y actually be th•: 
crimes which never take rtace"' (Clapham 200.L6·-;'/. Th1') i::. particularly conce;·rnng ""hen 
one considers that deterrence \Vas a prirnaiy _mstifo::arion for the creation of these 
international institutmns. H also lenves unmwwered the question 'bow is iniemat1ona1 
criminal justice manifest?' 
For Colson (2000:58), '[t]he ~tarting point [in responding to this question_! is to conceive 
of international justice as a process which in i1srlf has significance, no matter what the 
expected outcomes of the process are'. H c argues that the investigation and denunciation of 
war crimes by the ICTY, prior to any actual trials. had tv,ro important effects: 
(J) 'victims and their rchitives experienced a form of relief -- at last their status as 
victims was being taken seriously by the international community through one of its 
institutions' (58) and 
42 See <www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/61hrc.htm:. acc~~'cd 7 tJcl1•bcr 2003, for details. 
43 See <www.unhchr.ch/htmi/rncnu2i6/cat.htm·,. ~cccssd 7 Octc.b,:1 2003, for details. 
44 Goddard (2000:464) argues othern i:-,e: 'Am! ('\ C'1 It llrdy a few of the perpetrators or genocide, crimes 
against humanity, or war crimes are held (\) acwunL thl'll e xam1ples may serve to deter others similarly 
minded, and that in itself'will be a resounding vtcldr_v :·()rail h1unam1ty'. This view should he compared with 
the in-depth evaluation put fonvard by Wippman ( l 9~N) wh1<:h c-oncludes the uncertainty of the deterrent 
effect. 
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(2) 'to a limited but significant extent, accusations made against Bosnian-Serb leaders 
Radovan Karadziae and Ratko Mladiae weakened their popular support' (58-59). 
Furthermore, Colson argues, as does Booth, that, in general, international tribunals ensure 
that collective assignation of guilt is avoided (Colson 2000:60; Booth 2003: 185). The 
overall effect then is one of catharsis (Colson 2000:59). That is, the activity of the 
international tribunals supports 'the hypothesis of international justice as a cathartic 
process' (Colson 2000:60). 
It is appropriate to note at this point that not all commentators are of the view that the 
avoidance of collective assignation of guilt is necessarily a beneficial outcome of 
international tribunals. Rather, Teitel ( 1999:298) proposes, in spite of the proposed 
advantages articulated above, that 'such emphasis on ascribing individual accountability ... 
is of questionable value because individual proceedings ultimately obscure the profound 
role of systemic policy in repression'. Locating his criticism directly within the trial 
process, he argues that 'the insistence on proof of individual motive can be misleading, as 
it obscures the extent to which persecutory policy is a social and above all political 
construct' (299). Consequently, there is a need for international tribunals, if they are to 
continue to assign individual responsibility, to ensure that the 'significance of systemic 
persecution . . . [and] the extent to which the architecture of genocide [and other human 
rights abuses] [are] political' (298-299) is clear to the world audience. 
Returning to the manifestation of international criminal justice, while Akhavan does not 
share Colson's specific conceptualisation, he provides further support for the view of 
international criminal justice as manifest beyond the trials conducted in its name. He argues 
that the mere 'stigmatization of criminal conduct may have far-reaching consequences, 
promoting post-conflict reconciliation and changing the broader rules of international 
relations and legitimacy' (2001: l ). Specifically, 
international criminal tribunals can play a significant role in discrediting and containing 
destabilizing political forces. Stigmatizing delinquent leaders through ipdictment, as well 
as apprehension and prosr?cution, undermines their influence (2001: 1 ).4 :i 
That international criminal justice is manifest in this way is demonstrated by the fact that 
the international policy of discrediting wmiirne leader~. and the criminalization of the 
fonner leadership of Repubiika Srpska by the ICTY, have allowed new leaders such as 
Dodik to emerge and to make statements that would have constituted political suicide in 
another context (2001:5). 
Akhavan also agrees with Colson that the international tribunals play a valuable role for 
victims in ensuring that the crimes against them 'do not fall into oblivion' (2001: 1 ). Jn these 
ways, international criminal justice manifests itself in a 'significant contribut[ion] to peace 
building in post-war societies' and through the introduction of 'criminal accountability into 
the culture of international relations' (2001 :2). Notably, these achievements correspond 
with several of the justifications put forth for the creation of the international tribunals. 
At the same time it has been the frustration and dissatisfaction of victim communities 
with limited and exclusive tribunal-based justice which has stimulated recourse to local 
community justice resolutions. This has created its own challenges to international criminal 
justice in that the alternative exercises, while being concerned with elements of crimes 
against humanity or genocide, have been coloured by domestic tensions and compromises. 
45 Notably, the tone of Akhavan 's argument indicates his belief that indictment in itself is important in 
undermming influence, regardless of apprehension and prosecution. 
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International criminal justice is also declared in national criminal law. As outlined 
above, anticipation of the eventual entry into force of the Rome Statute resulted in 
significant and widespread legislative changes to domestic laws. Furthermore, it has been 
shown that the requirements of the international tribunals and the rules ofjus co gens had a 
similar re-formulating effect on national justice. Yet discussions of international criminal 
justice continually either overlook or underestimate the importance of these changes. Booth 
(2003: 178) proposes that the function of an ICC trial will be 'first and foremost a 
proclamation that certain conduct is unacceptable to the world community'. Compatible 
with this intention, domestic legislation is being enacted world-wide to bring the national 
criminal law of more and more countries into line with the Rome Statute. Each such 
enactment represents a step closer to Clapham's 'transnational legal order' (Clapham 
2003 :65), at least in a legislative and institutional sense. 
Alternative paradigms? 
Certainly international criminal justice is not purely the domain of international trial 
institutions and the processes which flow, or are purported to flow, from them. Expansive 
efforts to create an international criminal justice outside the framework of criminal 
prosecution are evidenced particularly in post conflict and transitional states, the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) being a celebrated example. In the 
South African case, amnesty was offered in return for 'full disclosure of all the relevant 
facts relating to acts associated with a political objective '46 -- as Dyzenhaus (2003 :366) 
points out, this led some to believe that justice, seemingly being unlikely to be achieved 
given the continuing strength of the old regime, had been traded for the truth. The opposing 
view, in Dyzenhaus' analysis, is that justice was not negotiated, or sacrificed, but rather 'the 
way the TRC went about finding out the truth achieved a kind of justice different from----
even superior to---- crimimil or rctribu11v1.-~ justic--:' (2003:366), namely n.:storafr"e justice. 
While thi-: latter vicvv· is arguably the more convmcing uf the t\vo, its most critical 
ingredient is the implied dichotomy of rdnbutin~/guilt-based justice and restorativc/truth·-
bascd justice. Jn this analysis, the two seem to be posi1cd as mutually exclusive, incapable 
of happy coexistence. We have esiablisl1ed., in the con1ext of inh~rnational criminal justice, 
that tlm dichoi-mny is false (Findlay & Benham 2005:ch~7,8). A comparative exploration 
of the objedives underlying both lhe · fomml' instit11tional attempts at international criminal 
justice and the 'informai' community approachi.:s shows .. not only that the two can. with 
institutional transformation, co-exist in a transitional context, but that there is also 
significant scope for restorative themes to be incorporated into the procedural framework 
of international trials. 47 This has been recognised recently by the Chief Prosecutor for the 
ICC when commenting on the role of the court in conflict resolution. 
The motives for international criminal justice through institutions and institutional 
processes have been articulated, and form a starting point for the i.:omparative projcct.48 As 
noted, one of the justifications for the creation of intem::iflional tribunals and the ICC was 
that it would develop an accurate historical record. This goal also underlies the 
establishment of truth and reconciliation commissions. However, where the proposed 
merits of such a record are viewed in instrumental term:; by proponents of due process, 
centred on deterrence of future violence, the 1Jbjcctiv1es of supporters of truth and 
reconciliation commissions are much more exprcssiw in nature and tied to understanding 
46 Promotion of National Umn· and Reco11ctlw11011 A.er ! 9q5_ Cite(~ rn 1Cassese 1998:4. 
47 An argument for this is posed in the context of the influenc•-' \\l-1ch Ch;na might have over the development 
of international criminal justice. See Findlay 2007c. 
48 Henham has explored this in relation to intern:itional sen1cnc1ng Sete H~nham 2003, 2004. 
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at the interests of victim communities. For example, Coakley (2001 :233) expands on the 
purpose of memory and truth-telling in the following manner: 
In order to alleviate the suffering associated with memory, the process of truth telling is seen 
as an essential component of any attempt at healing and reconciliation ... the truth of 
individual suffering is a vehicle to achieve both individual and collective healing. The 
stories of the victims are supposed to move people collectively thus diminishing the 
legacies of violence by sharing its effects ... This process can help heal society's wounds 
and restore dignity to the victims of the previous regime. 
The contrast between these instrumental and expressive objectives raises several issues. 
First, the disjunction makes it possible that different 'truths' will be created within the 
adjudication process, a situation which has inevitably led to debate over what the 'best' 
truth might be, and for what purpose. While Scharf (1999:513) argues vociferously that 'the 
most authoritative rendering of the truth is only possible through a trial that accords full due 
process', he is countered by those who argue, that, a truth commission operating in 
conjunction with amnesty provisions 'promotes a process of truth-finding in which a fuller 
picture of the truth emerges than would in a series of trials, since amnesty seekers have an 
interest in making full disclosure' (Dyzenhaus 2003:366). The proposed incompatibility of 
retributive and restorative justice in this view hinges then on the perceived necessity of 
amnesty for truth. Again, we do not see this as inevitable and by deconstructing this 
proposed conjunction two questions can be addressed: 
(I) Which ofrhe two approaches produces the more accurate and more complete record 
of events, that is the 'better truth '? 
Implicit in the question are the assumptions that (a) the complete truth can never be fully 
recovered, if for no other reason than the fallibility of human memory, and (b) that accuracy 
is imperative to lhe production of trnth. In raising this second concern we are careful not to 
equate accuracy with factuality in any legal sense. As a consequence of adversarial 
argument in particular, what i5 accepted as fact to satisfy the requirement of criminal 
evidence may be more a prevailing argument, than truth. 
Sarkin ( 1997:529-530) adds a 1ealist political dimension to valuing the '·better' truth. In 
the context of South Africa 'a new nation cannot be built on denial of the past'. That civil 
and political distrust can be overcome through what would effectively be the withholding 
of truth, it is argued is illogical. 
Scharf ( t 999:513) cites as support for his view comments by Justice Robert Jackson, the 
Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg --- most significantly: 'According to Jackson, the 
.establishment of an authoritative record of abuses that would eudure the test of time and 
withstand the challenge of revisionism required proof "of incredible events by credible 
evidenc'" .49 Thus, although he does not state it so explicitly, it seems that Scharfs opinion 
of the superiority of the criminal trial as a truth-producing mechanism stems from a faith in 
the rules governing such trials, in particular the rules of evidence and the required standard 
of proof. A problem with this conclusion rests in the problematic but assumed correlation 
between truth and what will stand as evidence towards criminal liability. The argument goes 
that the more probative the 'fact' the more it is trnth. The contest between the narratives of 
the criminal tribunals, and the stories of the truth commissions, is more particularly 
49 Quoting a Report to the President from Justice Robert H Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United States in 
the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals, 7 June 1945, reprinted in 39 American Journal of International Law 
178 (Supp 1945). 
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determined. we would argue by the completeness of the recount (and its legitimacy for 
victim c0mmmities), beyond its evidentiary status for tribunal chambers. 
Vie\\ ing the trial as a series of process-generated decision-making sites, Scharf s 
standpoint-sat the core a belief that each of these sites, or tuming--points, tests the evidence 
such that only accurate information is allowed to be woven into the picture of truth - it is 
a faith in p;ocedure to filter out erroneous claims and dubious evidence, and thus produce 
'the truth'. This, we submit, is misguided. 
First. it Jresupposes the infallibility of the trial structure, without acknowledging the 
inherent wrnknesses of both adversarial and inquisitorial systems when it comes to eliciting 
the whole s~ory, paiiicularly from a victim perspective. Many rules of evidence, in fact, are 
designed tc circumscribe the fullest recount against the rights of the accused or prevailing 
probatiYe cmsiderations. From this imperative there is a genuine potential of the criminal 
trial to dist)rt the truth. Let us begin with the rules governing admissibility of evidence. 
There arc m grounds for assuming that evidence deemed inadmissible is inaccurate or vice 
versa; it m~y have been illegally obtained, it may be more prejudicial than probative and 
lack corrotoration, but the possibility that it is accurate (or inaccurate) remains. Judicial 
discretion t) admit illegally or improperly obtained evidence, or that extracted under duress 
-- because its probative value outweighs its potential benefit ----may do little more than 
suggest a r:lative likelihood of truth emerging from a flawed process. Thus the rules of 
evidence cm operate to produce a partial truth. 
Furrhernore, the fact that opposing counsel cm1 parnt vastly differing stories from 
examinati01 of the same witnesses renders questionable the truth-finding potential of the 
adversarial trial. This process of story construction has implfftant repercussions in relation 
to the 'catlurtic' function oftc'>tifying carlic1 propo~cd by Cnlson It highlights the inherent 
distotting 1otcnt1J.l of the critnin<il trial. in ih ~;1.:.:<l:·di for prevaiiing fact rather than 
negotiated ruth. 
Nina ar~ues thot sckcti·vity of a difforent nature wa;, ell work in th\? South African TRC. 
Jn his ana ysis. 'the sl:1te is pri\'ikging the ;.,vi iting nf ,,_ paiiicular history it is the 
constructicn of a \'ery limi1ed and contrnlleJ hi~tc.<1:, · (?'-Jina 19'9/ 66-70 ). perhaps mmt 
conden:minr 'One ge!.s the impn:s·~ion a,; if there \\lb !W\'er apartheid or reasons to revolt 
against if 69). The core of his argument 1s that in :.1 \ksperate bid to avoid confrontation 
with the [v.hitcs]' (65). th:;· TRC re-created an a1._"('C1rnrnorlati .re. edited history - - a history 
of the very nature held above to be unsatisfactory. Even >;(1, the stories emerging from out 
of the Corrmission produced admission which may never have emerged through a formal 
adversarial process. 
Qualifyng any such assertions, further criticism oft he South African TR Cs truth-
finding abiity in contrast with trial process, comes from Dyzenhaus (2003:367). 
rA]neclotal evidence suggests that perpetrato:~ often stuck to a script, probably co-
ordinacd by the few lawyers who appeared time and dgain v.vitb this group, which disclosed 
as littlt as possible and attempted to con1inc irnp!icat- ng )thcr" to implicating security force 
actors vho had died. 
Without cornnenting on matters of accuracy,:'O thi'> .:riLiqwe draws attention to the potential 
for distorti m within the framework of a truth com mi s..:i.Ji\ as well as through trial decision-
making, b:cause of the necessity to n12gotiatc r art icipan t interests, or navigate rule 
limitations Arguably as the truth commissions have fo uncd in particular, this distortion, no 
50 To make ,uch a judgment v.·ould reqrnrc thorough Ill\ cstil,C<ll 1c111' 1w, .. ide the scope of this paper. 
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matter what the process of extraction and deliberation, may be heightened and the resultant 
'truth' further weakened, where the process operates without flexible amnesty provisions. 
(2) Are amnesty provisions necessary for a truth commission to operate? 
The incentive beyond rare and genuine contrition (which should not be dismissed as an 
ingredient of truth commission hearings) for perpetrators to provide 'full disclosure' if they 
are faced with prosecution, is indemnity if not amnesty. The challenge is to enable amnesty 
provisions which are open and responsible and do not essentially sacrifice retributive 
outcomes for restorative 'truth' seeking. We argue this is both appropriate and achievable 
within the contexts of transformed deliberative domains. 
It is through compromise with retributive justice (recognising the complexity of 
legitimate victim interests) that restorative justice and truth seeking will best be achieved. 
Indeed a combined model would overcome many of the weaknesses of the two separate 
approaches in terms of truth-finding, arguably representing a more robust international 
criminal justice than is currently being achieved. In saying this, we do not advance as a 
hypothetical model on these lines the creation of an international truth commission to 
operate in conjunction with the ICC. This has not proved successful in Sierra Leone. 51 The 
transformed trial mechanism52 wherein the judge could move from adversarial trial 
procedures to truth-finding and mediation has the benefit of encouraging disclosure as truth 
rather than actionable fact, while the evidence given in any adversarial context could be 
tested by the judge for the purposes of liability if appropriate. Furthermore, the 
amalgamation of these approaches would better accommodate the administration of 
juvenile justice, wherein welfare and restorative agendas are more apparent. Linton 
(2001 :237) highlights this in the context of Sierra Leone --- while adults will be prosecuted 
for atrocities in the Special Court, '[t]he Security Council has stressed that other 
institutions, such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, are better suited to deal with 
juveniles'. 
Thus far, the discussion has focused on perpetrators' contribution to the truth, and the 
potential production of conflicting 'perpetrator truths' as a consequence of the contrast 
between the instrnmental and expressive objectives of criminal trials and truth commissions 
respectively. Yet this contrast also translates into two different experiences for victims. As 
noted, Colson argues that international criminal justice, as manifest through the 
international tribunals, is a cathartic process. Central to his theory is the idea of 
'psychoanalytic catharsis included in the act of testifying' (2000:60), and the argument that 
the purpose, the medium, and the setting of the ICTY are all conducive to the cathartic 
process. That is, the purpose is to clarify 'thought by removing ign0ranct;', the medium of 
testimony allows victims to express their trauma and therefore relieve the stress attached to 
it, and the setting provides a safe and controlled locus ... a properly distanced context'. The 
analysis, however, neglects the aforementioned potential for distortion inherent to the trial 
process. This has significant repercussions for victims' cathartic experiences. 
At a basic level, what of those victims who are not allowed to testify? In a purely 
evidentiary context, their testimony can be deemed more prejudicial than probative, and 
would violate the accused's right to a fair trial. While it is imperative that this right be 
upheld if the court or tribunal is to achieve legitimacy as tribunals of liability, the refusal to 
admit a wider range of victim testimony denies the potential of the trial as a chamber of 
truth. As with many forn1alist commentators, Colson does not explore the emotional 
51 For a critique of this binary approach see Cockayne 2004. 
52 See Findlay & Henham 2005. 
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consequences for the victim and victim communities. Victims in the context of genocide in 
particular want the perpetrators punished but equally need their story to be told. Excluded 
from trials currently constituted because their testimony may not qualify as evidence, 
victims conclude that their story was less important, a feeling which, when widespread, may 
adversely affect healing and reconciliation. From a victim perspective, the legitimacy of the 
trial process from which their story has been removed will also be impugned. 
For those victims who do testify, what is the impact of having their stories selectively 
constructed, destroyed, and reconstructed in examination and cross-examination? Not only 
are their experiences distorted, but they are taken out of their hands completely and retold 
through the voice of professionals. This loss of ownership, along with the procedurally 
enforced restraints preventing the accurate telling of their stories, will more likely lead to 
increased frustration and dissatisfaction for victims than it will to catharsis. They will not 
feel, as Colson (2000:58) argues they would, that their status as victims is 'being taken 
seriously by the international community through one if its institutions'. Indeed, the validity 
of Colson's analysis depends on victims being able to take the stand, tell their story, and 
step down; however the trial operates in a very different way. His analysis is constrained 
within the confines of the international criminal trial currently constructed and as such 
relegates the victims and the power of their stories to truth commissions, where the 
purported objectives are expressive rather than instrumental. With the incorporation of this 
new level of 'truth' within a transformed criminal trial process, the divergence of justice 
paradigms would be breached and legitimate victim interests merged within an institution 
which is to some degree accountable in terms of formal rights and responsibilities. 
As Dyzenhaus (2003:366) points out, one claim of supporters of truth commissions is 
that 'in that process the victim has a role that goes well beyond serving as an instrument to 
achieve conviction' The argument continues that in raking this expanded role in telling 
rbc;ir stories, ·victims might find not only rhat they can come to krrnfi with the abuses, but 
also that they are "restored'. w a rdm.ionship of equality with the perpetrators, so Jhat they 
can develop a sense of agency appropriate for participation in a democratic society' (366). 
Coakley f20f) i :234) draw'} attention to this funl.'.tion of a truth commission to ,;provide a 
forurn for people v1ho have not been able to tell their story before'. She nt.)ks the writing of 
one cummissioncr at the Ullited Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador: 
One could not listen to them without recognising that the mere act of telling what hnd 
happened was a heaiing emotional release. and that they were more interested in recounting 
their story and being heard than in retribution. It is as if they felt some shame that they had 
not dared to speak out before, and, now that they had done so, they could go home and focus 
on the future less encumbered by the past (Burgenthal 1994, quoted in Coakley 2001 :234). 
The parallels with Colson's proposed cathartic process are clear - it is simply the setting 
which differs. Furthermore, Coakley (2001 :234) argues that this experience goes beyond 
the individual, having 'a ''cathartic" affect [sic] in society, making it possible for a society 
to "cleanse" itself through this process of breaking the silence and acknowledging a 
shameful period in its history'. 
However, this view is not unchallenged. Dyzenhaus (2003:366) warns that the reality of 
the South African TRC 'should provide a highly cautionary note'. He points to evidence 
presented by Wilson that many victims did not get to testify at the TRC. and that those who 
did 'often found themselves in a micro-managed process in which their testimony was 
reduced to the empirical data the TRC required' (Dyzenhaus 2003:366, drawing on Wilson 
200 l ). Wilson argues that the TRC instrumentalises victims' testimonies in the same 
manner as does the criminal prosecution, the only difference being the TRC does so 'to 
assist the project ofnation-building' (Wilson 200 I, cited in Dyzenhaus 2003:367), whereas 
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the criminal prosecution does so 'to achieve the end of conviction' (Wilson 2001, cited in 
Dyzenhaus 2003:366). This is contestable against the governance aspirations of alternative 
criminal justice paradigms recognised recently by the ICC prosecutor. 
Conclusion 
Not accidentally this paper has drawn its discussion of emerging international criminal 
justice to the convergence ofrestorative and retributive themes. It is the next great challenge 
in the development of justice globally to synthesise (and assimilate within the rights 
framework of the trial process) the formal and informal paradigms for the sake oflegitimate 
victim interests, without sacrificing the rights provided through the trial or the inclusive 
flexibility of the less formal resolution processes. 
The existence of informal manifestations of justice to resolve crimes against humanity, 
being attempts by communities to realise international criminal justice at a local level, 
highlights that a variety of legitimate victim needs must be satisfied if international criminal 
justice is to be realised. They show that the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC cannot in 
themselves represent international criminal justice. Rather non-fonnal resolutions are 
taking on a resonance which cannot be ignored. The satisfaction of the needs they highlight 
must be more strongly recognised within the fabric of international criminal justice. While 
the development of these restorative processes should not be hindered by institutions 
designed for more retributive purposes, there is a need to open up the trial as a restorative 
tool so that it is more inclusive of victim interests and more responsive to community 
expectations. This will necessitate a reshaping of the formal institutions and community 
responses if international criminal justice is to be fut ly realised. A new no1mative 
framework which values 'humanity' as its focus and 'truth' as its outcome will be the driver 
for change. 
An important consequence of international criminal justice better meeting the legitimate 
needs of victim communities will be the resolution of conflict and the advancement of 
peace-making. Braithwaite (2002) similarly claims this for restorative _justice when appiied 
to state reconstruction. The limitations of trial-based retributive justice mean that in its 
fonnal incarnation, international criminal justice is not as influential as it might be in long 
lasting global governance challenges (Findlay 2007b ). 
The governance potentials of international criminal justice should not be limited to bi·· 
products of a re-emphasised restorative dimension. As the ICC in particular will require 
productive integration across national, regional and international criminal justice systems 
in order to achieve its prosecutorial mandate, this will provide an opportunity for justice 
alliances (or at least understandings) which are the foundations for global governance. 
International criminal justice, as a force for global governance, therefore, depends on its 
capacity to resolve conflict and to enhance the national and regional mechanisms for 
sustaining good governance within a legal rights framework. In achieving this, the 
recognised interests of victim communities will legitimise the exercise of international 
criminal justice in all its forms, and will commend the capacity of global governance to 
resolve and avoid conflict. The transformation of international criminal justice suggested 
above will allow international political alliances to progress the objective of world peace 
above military dominance. A cmcial factor in reaching such accommodations will be an 
ability to reconcile, injustice decision-making, the competing claims to truth/responsibility 
and fact/liability. This is the challenge for those who manage the process that leads to 
international criminal justice coming of age. 
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